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Abstract In the vision of an ambient intelligent world, innumerable small
interconnected devices will surround us and support us in our daily tasks
and while at leisure. To do so, these devices need to know and exchange
our personal preferences. Moreover, without any built-in countermeasures
these devices are more than able to collect much more private information.
This paper presents the goals and aims of the Privacy in an Ambient World
(PAW) project. The purpose of PAW is to build a privacy protecting archi-
tecture for the future ambient world. This architecture is based on two
foundations. To control, and to empower the user to control, the dissem-
ination of personal preferences a licensing system will be developed. This
licensing system is similar, but not equal, to licensing schemes used in
digital rights management. To limit unwanted and surreptitious private
information collection, private computing schemes for ambient systems
will be developed. Both approaches are detailed in this paper.
1 Introduction
In the near-future ambient world, interconnected intelligent devices will sur-
round us, at home or while travelling. These devices and their local networks
will also be connected to the outside world through broadband and/or wireless
networks. Numerous services to support us in our personal life will be provided
through these ambient devices, and over the connection to the outside world.
To adapt to our personal life style, and to offer the right service at the right
time in the right place, such services will rely on the use of private data. In
particular user profiles will have to be kept and exchanged. The ambient devices
may either learn about us and our personal preferences either through explicit
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customisation by their owners, or by unobtrusively observing our behaviour. In
both cases, these devices will learn much about our private lives.
This scenario poses a direct threat to our privacy in a variety of ways. The
current approach towards protecting our privacy is by hiding our identity (e.g.,
by using pseudo-identities). However, hiding our identity does not mean our
privacy is completely protected. Our actions, even when they are anonymous, can
thwart good privacy protection, because of the possibility that various pieces of
information can be linked together. Carefully considering the concept of privacy,
we see that privacy protection can be divided into four different aspects.
1. Protecting a person’s identity (e.g., our name).
2. Protecting an identity’s personal data (e.g., our preferences).
3. Protecting the actions undertaken by an identity (e.g., our activities).
4. Protecting the instructions or tasks scheduled by an identity (e.g., software
and mobile code executed on our behalf).
To provide full privacy, adequate solutions must be found for each of these
categories.
The first category, protecting our identity is mainly about protection during
identification actions, and has been the focus of most of the research on privacy
(see Section 2). Not in all cases it is necessary to perform identification using our
name. Sometimes a role or a pseudonym will be sufficient, for example.
Controlling our own personal data involves more than simply hiding our iden-
tity. Even when using pseudonyms, we need to provide many personal data items
to other persons or entities in a system, e.g., to let the system behave according
to our preferences. Once we reveal that information, we have no control over
it anymore and other entities are able to obtain personal information that can
affect our privacy. Solutions to this problem provide privacy in the second cat-
egory.
The third and fourth categories are concerned with our privacy in our home
and in extensions of our home environment in the outside world. Both are best
illustrated by an example. Suppose you are staying in a hotel, and you want
to perform some activities using some of the devices in the hotel room and
using some data stored back home. To do this, your home environment must
be extended to this hotel room maintaining privacy to prevent the hotel from
collecting information about your activities. This is an example of privacy in the
third category.
Due to advances in software technology, reasoning about privacy needs to be
taken one step further and must also consider the protection of instructions or
tasks scheduled by an identity (i.e., the fourth category). An example of this is
mobile code, aka agents. The idea behind agents is that they can travel over the
network and be executed at various nodes. This in stark contrast with the tradi-
tional approach where only static data is transmitted over the network. Mobile
software leads to many privacy and security risks. Consider the case in which a
program for reserving a hotel room is sent over the network. The program may
be executed at computers owned by hotels and it may be in the interest of a hotel
to obtain some insight into the contents of the program so that it can adjust its
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offer according to the user’s criteria. This is of course a privacy risk, moreover
the hotel may eventually offer a higher price than it would have if it had not
known the user’s criteria to make a booking.
The objective of the PAW (Privacy in an Ambient World)1 project, that re-
cently started on a grant obtained form the Dutch ministry of Economic Affairs,
is to develop a privacy protecting architecture that can provide full privacy of
the user in an ambient world. As said before, full privacy can only be achieved
by providing adequate solutions for each of the four categories described for
the home-environment. Therefore the main objective of the project is to find
solutions in those categories that have not been addressed yet in research (i.e.,
categories 2, 3 and 4).
In this paper we elaborate on the approach to be taken by the PAW project
to construct such an architecture. First, in Section 2 we summarise the state-
of-the-art of privacy protection, relevant to the PAW project. Our approach to
protecting privacy is described and motivated in Section 3. It is based on two
principles.
– To control, and to empower the user to control, the dissemination of personal
data a licensing system will be developed. This licensing system is similar,
but not equal, to licensing schemes used in digital rights management.
– To limit unwanted and surreptitious private information collection, private
computing schemes for ambient systems will be developed.
Technical details of our work are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes
this paper.
2 State of the art
The privacy goals discussed in the Introduction have been partially addressed
in the literature, mainly in the following fields:
1. confidential communications,
2. database management,
3. mobile systems, and
4. ubiquitous computing and ambient systems.
We will discuss the state-of-the-art research in each these fields separately, in so
far as it concerns the goals and approach of the PAW project.
Privacy in confidential communications. In this field privacy is prevalently in-
terpreted as a capability of not revealing, while communicating, confidential in-
formation. Information leakage must not happen either through a direct dis-
closing or through indirect tracing (e.g., leaving traces that may ultimately be
traced back to the information). In this sense, confidential information includes
1 Additional information and future developments on the PAW project can be obtained
from our project web site http://www.cs.kun.nl/paw .
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both user’s identity and personal data. The former has been studied within an-
onymity [Cha85, Cha92, SS96, Aba99, Shm02] and pseudo-identities preserving
techniques [LRSW99]. The latter is more related with secrecy, widely studied
in [Mea96, Sch98, AG97, THG98, Aba99, AD01]. In some approaches, secrecy and
anonymity are commonly defined as information hiding properties, as [HO02,
HO03] show. On the other hand [HO03] show how secrecy and some standard
notion of anonymity subtly differ from each other.
Privacy in database management In this category, privacy is intended mainly
as a guarantee that unauthorised disclosure of sensitive data will not take place
e.g., by inference attacks or statistical queries. Therefore the main privacy goal
is to protect users’ personal data.
In [And01] Anderson discusses the problems of multilateral security and in-
ference control [Den82]. Briefly the first problem concerns the definition of fit-
ting access controls, w.r.t. a set of data, in order to prevent sensitive information
from flowing towards unauthorised entities. The second problem, known since
1960’s, studies statistical security, that is how to protect sensitive data from
being disclosed by statistical queries involving it. A brief introduction about
recent results, trends and references about inference control in statistical data-
bases can be found in [DF02]. Inference control problems arise also in multilevel
databases [JM95], where data are classified into confidentiality privacy levels e.g.,
high (private) and low (non-private). No inference problem exists if a user can-
not infer any high information from a sequence of queries that each involves low
level data only.
In [HILM02] the problem of guaranteeing privacy in a model of application
service providers (ASP) is studied. In ASP “applications as services” are supplied
to Internet costumers by some provider. Precisely [HILM02] focuses on “data-
bases as a service”, where a databases provider offers its services in storing data
and running queries in the behalf of a customer. For the customer might not
trust completely in its provider, he does not want the provider could perform its
own queries on the database. “Database as service” problem is also considered
in [HIM02].
In [GIKM98] a solution to the algorithmic problem of Symmetric Private In-
formation Retrieval (in short SPIR) is studied. The SPIR problem involves both the
goal of users’ identity and data privacy. In fact it aims to satisfy the two following
conditions: (a) to avoid that the data base manager could know the identity of the
user, (b) to avoid that the user could retrieve more information than just the in-
formation required. Hence in this problem privacy is also used as protecting the
users’ identity. Similar to SPIR is the problem of “negotiating privacy”, studied
in [JLS02]. Negotiated privacy arises in any context where the goal of data collec-
tion is to detect and reveal “exceptional” conditions, while keeping routine events
completely hidden. The referred scenario involves a set of data owners who con-
sign their data to a database manager that, in turn, is allowed only to query
previously-negotiated properties while prevented to access any other users’ per-
sonal data. Negotiated privacy differs from SPIR schemes [GIKM98]. In the latter
the manager cannot retrieve data from a database without the collaboration of
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an user, while in the former no query may take place at all until the negotiated
conditions become true.
Privacy in mobile systems In this category privacy refers to a scenario where
mobile agents may run on different hosting machines. Here different privacy
goals arise. Firstly, privacy is preserved when no malicious host may learn secrets
while executing mobile agents, as studied in [ST98], so it refers mainly to task
and activity protection, but also data protection is involved. Secondly privacy
may protect an host from malicious actions by the agents, and it refers to data
or resource protection. In [Edw96] Edwards suggest the use of polices, in order to
allows users (or better, their applications) to control collaboration in a potentially
chaotic environment. Policies provides hosts with the ability to regulate access
to their information and personal space and to govern how their applications
will respond to events.
In [SBM03] a subset of Ambient Calculus [CG00b] is used to model a system
composed by entities which are organised in a hierarchical structure of inclusion.
For example, entities may represent either physical locations (e.g., an office, a
workstation, a laptop) or a logical locations (e.g., a context, an agent). Inclusion
represents either a physical (e.g., a workstation is in an office) or logical (e.g., an
agent runs in a context) inclusion among entities. A process — in this fragment of
the Ambient Calculus — represents an instantaneous picture of a system where
entities may find themselves located into other ones by following a tree-based,
spatial or logical inclusion relation. The security of the whole system is ruled by
security policies supervising the evolution of the system, formalised as formulas
of a decidable subset of Ambient Logic [CG00a].
Many articles have been written about code confidentiality, and most of them
define confidentiality for protecting code such that it is impossible to determine
the code’s content. Hohl [Hoh98] described a mechanism called "time limited
black box security", where the idea is to obfuscate the source code such that it
takes more time to understand the code than the programmed time limit. A more
cryptographic method is presented in [ST98] where Sander and Tschudin encrypt
functions that can be executed in its encrypted form. This method works for
polynomials and rational functions. Sander et al. [SYM99] extended the results to
all functions computable by circuits of logarithmic depth and further generalised
to arbitrary functions, provided they can be represented by a polynomial-size cir-
cuit. As far back as 1990, Abadi and Feigenbaum [AF90] described a method that
provides confidentiality for circuit evaluation. A disadvantage of this method
is that many interactions are required to provide confidentiality. Many other
solutions have been published to provide secure circuit evaluation, but none
of them is very practical and efficient. Loureiro et all. described how functions
can be hidden using coding theory [LM99]. Several more practical methods have
been proposed, but they are all based on either trusted hardware located at the
host [Yee99] or on the presence of a trusted third party or oblivious third party
[ACJG01].
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Privacy in ubiquitous and ambient computing In this last category, defining and
enforcing privacy is still very much an open question. Ubiquitous computing,
also known as ambient systems, is a general term to describe a world where in-
visible and comprehensive networks control and interact with public and private
life of users. Clearly, in such a world all the goals of privacy are involved. Few
works exist on how to define privacy policies, how to preserve them and how to
detect privacy violations in an ambient world.
In [Edw96] Edwards introduces the problem using polices in order to allows
users’ applications to control their activities when those ones run in a collabor-
ative and potentially chaotic environment. Policies provide users with the ability
to regulate access to their information and personal space and to govern how
their applications will respond to events. The authors show how control access
mechanisms suffice for modelling most common policies in the area of aware-
ness and coordination (e.g., anonymity, pseudonymity) both in their static and
dynamic (i.e., they may change as application run) version.
Another recent approach for describing privacy policies is the Platform for
Privacy Preferences (P3P)2 [Cra02]. P3P is a standard of the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) that specifies how to express privacy policies in Web sites and
browsers. P3P is intended to standardise the process in which Web servers and
Web users can agree on how a user’s personal information should be handled.
Also P3P-enabled Web sites make such privacy policies be available in a standard,
machine-readable format. Some experiences on the usage and testing of P3P are
discussed by Hogben et al. [HJW02], and by Cranor et al. [CBK03, CAG02].
In [LHJ+03, LDM02] Leder et al. discuss that in an ambient world, secrecy
and anonymity can only cover two extreme cases of privacy. In fact, in the many
situations of everyday life people wants or needs to share his information with
others. The general question is how to share personal information with the right
people and at the right level of detail. The authors call it everyday privacy. Cent-
ral to their model of privacy is the ability adjust the precision of dynamic contex-
tual information disclosed by a user to other people. For example a large spatial
precision may disclose your position only w.r.t. the town you are but not the
street, building, room we you indeed are. Control over precision provides con-
trol over the information density of a given disclosure. Further information may
be found in [Lan03, Lan02, LMD03, LMDB03].
3 The PAW approach
PAW is a project that looks at privacy in a very broad sense. All privacy aspects
are taken into account, not only confidentiality of data. The objective of PAW
is to develop a privacy protecting architecture that can provide full privacy of
the user in an ambient world. As said before, full privacy can only be achieved
by providing adequate solutions for each of the four categories described in the
introduction.
2 See also P3P Project website http://www.w3.org/P3P/.
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PAW’s approach to building a privacy enhancing architecture addressing these
categories is based on two principles.
detection To control, and to empower the user to control, the dissemination of
personal data a licensing system will be developed. This licensing system is
similar, but not equal, to licensing schemes used in digital rights manage-
ment.
prevention To limit unwanted and surreptitious private information collection,
private computing schemes for ambient systems will be developed.
Moreover, these detection and prevention techniques are combined into a single
architecture that is verified and validated separately.
The use of a licensing scheme for privacy protection has been suggested in
the past3 but has never been an object of serious academic study. The idea ori-
ginates from the observation that, at least from a theoretical perspective, the
objectives of a digital rights management (DRM) system and a privacy enhan-
cing technology are remarkably similar. Namely, both strive to control the use
and dissemination of data after the original owner released that data. Licensing
schemes have been proposed and investigated many times as the core of digital
rights management schemes (see Sect. 4.1). It seems only natural then to study
their application as a privacy enhancing technology as well.
Licensing based privacy protection is also a natural successor to schemes
like P3P [Cra02]. P3P’s main weakness is that privacy preferences of the user
are not enforced in any way, and only depend on the trustworthiness of the
owner of the website. The use of licenses extends such an approach with the
ability to automatically check for privacy violations: any data item for which no
corresponding license can be presented constitutes a possible privacy violation.
In fact, in a context like P3P, and similarly in an ambient context, maintain-
ers of websites and producers of ambient devices have an interest in handling
privacy correctly. Users have a broad choice of websites to visit. Like consumer
electronics today, users will have a broad choice of ambient devices to choose
from as well. Privacy protection is one of the selling points for such devices.
If the privacy protection is based on a licensing scheme, producers have more
than mere good faith to convince their consumers: by subjecting themselves to
license reviews, they can boost their trustworthiness in a reliable manner, and
gain a competitive advantage.
Private computing has been studied before, for instance in the precursor to
this project, the PISA project [PIS03], in which some of the current members parti-
cipated. Here we focus on two aspects. First of all, we continue to develop a theor-
etical model, such that the possibilities and impossibilities of privacy protection
in an ambient world become fully known. This will help us in providing practical
solutions to protect privacy. Secondly, existing cryptographic algorithms (e.g.,
for signing messages) are converted in such a way that they do not leak private
information (e.g., the private signing key) in adverse environments.
3 Dan Geer and others, June 25, 2002, on the cryptography mailing list
(cryptography@metzdowd.com).
8 K. Cartrysse et al.
4 Project components
The PAW project aims to combine a licensing approach with private computing
techniques in a single privacy protecting architecture. The licensing approach
actually consists of two parts: defining a licensing language together with its se-
mantics, and developing licensing protocols implementing and enforcing those
semantics. Moreover, the PAW project aims to more formally verify and validate
the architecture developed. These four parts of the project (licensing semantics,
licensing algorithms, private computing and verification & validation) are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
4.1 Licensing semantics
In order to protect and control the dissemination of explicit personal data like
user profiles, we are going to use a licensing system. The underlying idea is
that the use and the storage of explicit personal data are illegitimate unless
authorised by a specific license. The main functions of licenses are the following.
– To describe the authorised actions on the data.
– To specify terms and conditions for using the data.
– To describe the information of the data, e.g. to identify the data creator,
distributor and user or consumer.
– To ensure the integrity of the data.
To specify licenses we need an appropriate language, which must be compre-
hensive, generic and precise. In the literature there exist no suitable proposals.
In fact, no one has ever investigated the use of licensing languages for privacy
protection.
The licensing languages that can be found in the literature are the Digital
Right Languages (DRL), that are developed to describe the conditions of use of
digital assets such as music and video. In fact, the last few years have witnessed
a proliferation of DRLs — usually based on XML — like XrML4 and ODRL5. These
languages however are not suitable for protecting personal data. Indeed, they
leave a number of issues unresolved, which we will address in our research, and
which we briefly summarise here.
– DRLs are static. One of the challenges the language we aim at has to address
is that it has to be dynamic: personal data can be filtered, projected, joined,
etcetera. In one word, personal data can be transformed. Today’s DRLs are
static, and cannot cope with such a dynamic scenario.
– Lack of a formal semantics. DRLs rely on the intuition behind the syntactic
expressions. The interpretation of a license can be vague or even inconsist-
ent. The languages proposed are sophisticated and complex in syntax, but
poor in genuine semantics.
4 www.xrml.org
5 www.odrl.net
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– Lack of support for formally describing the environment of the license. In
modern business models, the environment is a crucial factor in deciding
whether a certain license can be employed or not.
– DRLs are not supported by design methodologies that allow designers to
study the consequences of their design during deployment. The design tools
associated with a design methodology would encourage designers to as what-
if questions, to which the tools would provide the answers. Currently it is
the harsh reality that reports that the system has been hacked or worse yet:
the hack may go unnoticed for some time.
Within the PAW project we are going to define a language for describing
licenses. Each of the above points represents a research question for the PAW
project. In particular the first two points raise a number of issues at all levels of
interest.
– At the language level, there is the need to project, split and recombine data.
Likewise, we must be able to transform the licenses so that they can follow
the evolution of the data. To do this, we need a formal language - the PAW
licensing language - that allows for algebraic manipulation.
– The semantics of the language has to be formal, and computable: we aim at
an architecture in which we can automatically check the validity of an action
involving the use of personal data.
– At the same time, the semantics of the language has to be able to describe the
usual conditions of use of personal data, which are often difficult to capture
in a formal framework.
– At the methodological level we see a paradigm shift from static to dynamic
licensing. Designers must now ensure that such a dynamic process would al-
ways adhere to the general terms and conditions agreed with the data owner.
To address these research problems we propose to design a generic frame-
work in which licenses can be modelled, and where new licenses can be created
or calculated from existing licenses according to precisely defined rules. The
licensing language will be integrated in the privacy protecting architecture.
4.2 Licensing algorithms
Complementing the licence semantics, we need secure methods and algorithms
to perform the following basic operations and tasks.
– Create/issue a license
– Store a license
– Link a licence to a particular data item
– Protect the integrity of the licence
– Transmit a license
– Verify the validity of a licence
– Check whether a certain action on a data item is allowed, given the license
– Revoke a licence
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These operations correspond to the most basic, static, use of licenses.
In our system, licenses are dynamic. Combining data items requires the cre-
ation of a combined license (based on the original licenses), guided by the se-
mantics of the join. Processing parts of data-items may require the splitting of
the corresponding licenses, one for each part. This is especially true when split-
ting is performed to transmit part of a data item to another principal. Regarding
this transfer of licenses, this requires the holder of the license to create a new
license on behalf of the original data owner for the new principal. This should of
course only be possible if the original license allowed the holder of the license to
create such sublicenses. Moreover, if the holder of the license is allowed to create
such sublicense, he should be able to do so without the cooperation of the ori-
ginal data owner (both to reduce the load on the data owner, but also to prevent
the data owner from restricting the terms of the license by not cooperating).
In short, this means that at least the following more complex operations need
to be securely implemented as well.
– Combine licenses (and their data items)
– Split licenses (and their data items)
– Project licenses (and their data items)
For the sublicensing algorithms we will use the delegation protocols (see
[HSK99]) as a starting point, as well as the ticketing concepts developed for
the Kerberos system (see [SNS88]) and protocols used in the digital rights man-
agement world. In any case, these algorithms should be efficiently computable
and not produce overly wieldy licenses. Moreover, we aim to develop off-line al-
gorithms that do not require participation of the original creator of the licenses
to perform the necessary operations on the license. Naturally, when a certain
operation is not performed by the license, the operation should be impossible
to be performed on it.
The licensing algorithms will be embedded into the privacy protecting archi-
tecture making use of the private computing platform developed as well (see
Section 4.3).
4.3 Private computing
The categories of protecting actions or protecting set tasks (as discussed in the
introduction) can be called private computing. In the former the user is physic-
ally present where the action is taking place, while in the latter the user is not
present where the computations are taking place. The difference between these
two categories is whether the software performing the action is mobile or not.
A remaining part of privacy is the user’s intention. It may be possible that
it is public knowledge who a user is, what data he owns and what he wants to
achieve performing a certain action or setting a task. However, the user may
require to keep his/her strategy (how to achieve the objective) private. In the
example where a user wishes to make a hotel room reservation, it may be that
his name and address together with the objective of making a reservation is
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information the user wishes to share with the hotel, but he is not willing to
share how he decides which room to take (based on rate, view, bath or shower,
etc…). The protection of someone’s strategy is an essential part of the categories
3 and 4. Especially when the code is executed at a untrustworthy host, this is a
difficult challenge.
Two main questions must be answered in this area of private computing.
– The first question is whether it is in theory possible to protect mobile soft-
ware against privacy and security attacks while these programs are executed
at untrustworthy hosts operated by the user (category 3) or operated by an
unknown user (category 4). In case the answer to this question is that full
protection is not possible, this may have serious implications for the success
of applications that are based on mobile software techniques such as mobile
software agents.
– The second question is whether the conventional cryptographic algorithms
are applicable in this mobile environment. This is unlikely, so new algorithms
must be developed in order to be able to provide full privacy in this envir-
onment.
The approach to answer the first question is to model the environment. The
main difference between this model and conventional software models is that
the execution environment cannot be trusted. It may be that the execution en-
vironment executes the code correctly, such that security is guaranteed, but if it
reads the unprotected code, it may be able to determine the content and privacy
is compromised. Important in this model are the locations where an attacker
may be present and what the attacker’s capabilities are. Some progress in this
area has already been made by some of the authors [CL04]. However, many ques-
tions are still unanswered. In [CL04] a definition for perfect secrecy is given, but
an encryption scheme that provides that is still unavailable. Several aspects and
attacks are taken into account, but these need to be extended. A second import-
ant aspect in this model is the definition of privacy. Using this model it may
then be possible to use information theory to define the theoretical boundaries
of providing privacy and security.
Several solutions to the second question can be found in the literature. Not all
conventional cryptographic techniques can be applied directly to protect mobile
software, as these techniques are usually based on the assumption that con-
fidential data can be left unprotected during execution because the execution
environment is trusted [CLY02]. A good example is the digital signing of mes-
sages. Signing a message means that a computation must be done using a private
key. The private key is information that should never be available to any other
party, trusted or not [CL02]. Hence, conventional cryptographic techniques must
be transformed such that they are applicable in a mobile software environment.
Within the PAW project, a realistic model will be built, such that both attacker
and privacy are modelled correctly. Using this model theoretical boundaries of
security and privacy may be found. This is then followed by research in the area
of converting conventional cryptographic algorithms into algorithms that can
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be used in a mobile software environment. The developed algorithms will be
incorporated in the privacy protecting architecture.
4.4 Validation and verification
Within PAW, several protocols for the exchange of privacy-sensitive data in dif-
ferent scenarios will be developed. For the formal verification of our commu-
nication protocols we aim to extend the results achieved in security protocol
verification (Millen and Shmatikov [CE02, MS01], CSP/FDR systems [Ros95]) to
build tools that verify the correctness of a protocol with respect to privacy. We
aim for verification tools that show clearly which parts of a so-called "Privacy
Disclaimer" are satisfied by the protocol. Moreover, we want to model attacks
(forged licenses, illegitimate operations) by the data-manager or an independent
attacker and verify that the system shows who violated the "Privacy Disclaimer"
with respect to the submitted data. In this way we endeavour 3 important results:
1. Proof to a data-manager that in fact, using these protocols, they are sure as to
not violate specific privacy regulations adapted by them or their government.
2. Guidelines for a government or a service provider as to what kind of privacy-
regulations can be implemented and by which protocols.
3. Proof to a data-subject that the data-manager indeed implements the privacy
regulations as expressed in the disclaimer.
Building on previous work within the PISA project [PIS03], licensing of privacy-
sensitive data will be implemented in a Job-market demonstration. Privacy sens-
itive data is exchanged between job-seeker-agents and employer-agents using
communication protocols and licenses attached to the exchanged data. To com-
pletely analyse such a system we aim to integrate the protocol verification tools
with tools that verify all PETs applied to this particular system. Finally in order to
fulfil the market’s and government’s demand for a clear insight in privacy issues
and more importantly how privacy enhancing technologies can be successfully
implemented, we aim to set up a framework that can evaluate applications in
any ambient scenario.
We think that in the coming years it is paramount that a service-provider can
check how and which privacy-regulations can be implemented in his system,
and that a controlling authority on behalf of users of the service can control
that the policy is correctly implemented. Very likely we will see a differentiation
of privacy policies and their implementations around the different sectors of
the market. Thus new dynamic test-beds that evaluate complete systems, using
different assurance levels as in the Common Criteria, can provide the necessary
trust in these new technologies for all participating parties.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have presented the PAW approach to building a privacy enhancing architec-
ture. The main components of this approach are the definition of a licensing
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language, the development of secure licensing protocols, the integration of the
licensing system into a private computing architecture, and the separate verific-
ation and validation of this architecture. In the coming years the PAW project
will further elaborate and implement the ideas outlined in this paper.
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